THE WORLD WON’T WAIT

Why Canada Needs to Rethink Its International Policies

Edited by Roland Paris and Taylor Owen
Canada needs a more ambitious, forward-looking, and effective international strategy. Profound global changes are casting doubt on assumptions that have long underpinned Canada’s foreign policy. No longer can the United States be relied upon either to drive Canadian economic growth or to single-handedly underwrite the global trading system and international security. Competition for markets, energy, and resources is intensifying. Communications technologies are collapsing distance and hierarchies, empowering new digital actors, but also raising new concerns about intrusive surveillance, cyberattacks, and violent radicalization across borders. Rising powers and non-state actors, from philanthropic foundations to terrorist networks, are playing a larger role on the global stage. Millions of people around the world are entering the global middle class for the first time, but other societies remain mired in cycles of poverty, poor governance, and conflict. The effects of climate change are multiplying, including in Canada’s north, where sea ice is rapidly disappearing.

These and other transformations matter for Canada and for our future. They matter, in part, because Canadians have long believed that their country should play a constructive role in addressing global problems; we are not isolationists. They also matter because these changes have potentially serious implications for the prosperity, security, and well-being of Canadians. If we fail to maintain Canada’s competitiveness, to address transnational threats to our security, or to deal with mounting global environmental problems,
to name but a few examples, current and future generations of Canadians will end up worse off.

To understand the impact of these changes, however, we first need to remind ourselves of the core objectives of Canada’s foreign policy. They are largely unchanging: to safeguard the security of Canada and Canadians; to create conditions for long-term economic growth at home; to protect and improve other aspects of Canadians’ quality of life, from a healthy natural environment to a free and open Internet; and to work with others globally to strengthen the rules-based international order and to increase peace, human rights, pluralism, economic opportunity, and environmental sustainability around the world. Some might quibble with these objectives, but they vary little from decade to decade. Yet the international context in which Canada pursues these goals is undergoing significant change. Understanding this context is essential for determining what means and methods Canada should employ to realize its objectives.

But there’s a problem: this kind of rethinking is barely occurring. Apart from a handful of books, occasional position papers and research reports from the country’s dwindling assortment of think tanks, and periodic newspaper op-eds and blog posts, debates about Canada’s foreign policy rarely move beyond the news story du jour. We seem to have lost our national capacity for long-term strategic thinking about international policy. Instruments traditionally employed by previous governments to conduct such reviews – white papers and royal commissions – have fallen into disuse. Parliamentary committees produce substantial reports from time to time, but they tend to focus on relatively narrow issues (one recent example is cluster munitions) or Canada’s policy towards specific countries (such as Ukraine or Syria), rather than on the broad directions of our international policy. Nor do academic foreign-policy specialists often examine these larger questions. They normally address more focused issues or the theoretical underpinnings of policy. This research can be fascinating and enlightening, but it ultimately offers little guidance for updating Canada’s international policy in a world of breathtaking change.

Meanwhile, the very concept of foreign policy is being called into question as the boundary between domestic and international
issues erodes. Nominally “domestic” matters such as economic competitiveness, social equity, innovation policy, post-secondary education, environmental protection, political radicalization, information security, labour market policy, critical infrastructure resilience, human trafficking, and maritime safety all require action at the international level as well. Conversely, the globalization of communications, technology, commerce, finance, and – more disturbingly – crime, extremist violence, and disease mean that international affairs is penetrating more deeply and widely into Canadian society than ever before. We are not the first to argue this point. Former Canadian diplomat George Haynal, for example, once described Canada’s relations with the United States as “intermestic” – a blend of international and domestic – and a number of academics have made similar observations about Canadian foreign policy more broadly. But the need to move beyond conventionally defined concepts of foreign policy has never been clearer.

In this book, we have therefore chosen to address Canada’s “international strategy” rather than its “foreign policy.” This terminological adjustment may seem minor, but it encompasses a wider variety of actors and issues. Canada’s foreign ministry and its diplomats remain important players, but many other actors are also active on issues that transcend national boundaries. They include provincial and local governments, non-governmental organizations, advocacy groups, private companies, networked actors, and individuals. We need to adopt a more heterogeneous perspective on the issues and actors at play in international policy.

This volume represents one attempt to do just that. The authors of the following chapters are some of the brightest thinkers in the country. While some do not consider themselves foreign-policy experts, their expertise in related fields – from city planning to mining – broaden and enliven this discussion. The result, we believe, is a refreshingly diverse set of views on the future of Canada’s international strategy. Indeed, we asked the authors to set aside old debates and settled wisdoms of Canadian foreign policy and to take a new look at eleven different international issues. They each had three tasks: first, to identify the main global trends bearing on their particular issue-area; second, to consider the positive and negative
implications of these trends for Canada; and, finally, to set out a forward-looking strategy that will position Canada to capitalize on new opportunities while mitigating future risks.

As we shall see, although there are interesting points of disagreement between the authors, they arrive at strikingly similar prescriptions for the future directions of Canada’s international policy. We describe these similarities in the Conclusion, and draw out their implications for the future of Canada’s international strategy. For now, however, suffice it to say that there is broad agreement on the need for Canada to pursue a more comprehensive, constructive, and ambitious international strategy – more comprehensive in involving private actors and civil-society groups in the conception and implementation of policy; more constructive in working with other countries, non-government organizations, and multilateral institutions towards common goals; and more ambitious in placing Canada at the forefront of efforts to make the world safer, more prosperous, and healthier.

In the Conclusion, we go further, arguing that many of these prescriptions point to the necessary renewal of Canada’s commitment to liberal internationalism, now updated to reflect the world that is emerging, rather than the world we have known. The label “liberal internationalism” can sometimes excite partisan passions, but it should not – at least, not in the way we are using it here. It refers not to the Liberal Party of Canada, but rather to the “small l” liberal belief in the value of diplomacy and international cooperation, institutions, and rules as means of securing Canadian interests and addressing global problems. This approach was at the core of Canada’s largely non-partisan international policy for the better part of six decades following the Second World War, and its most successful practitioner in recent decades was arguably a (Progressive) Conservative prime minister, Brian Mulroney, who invested in diplomacy and the military while championing Canada’s role in the United Nations, among other things. Although some of the contributors to this volume might not agree with this point, we believe that a refurbished liberal internationalism offers the basis for an effective, forward-looking policy – a policy that any Canadian government should embrace, regardless
of its political stripe. But whereas liberal internationalism traditionally prized diplomacy in formal multilateral institutions, the contributors to this volume describe a more complex and diverse world in which a wider variety of actors (not just states) engage in more diverse and fluid forms of cooperation (not just multilateral organizations), among other changes. To be effective, Canada’s international policy – whether or not it is rooted in a renewed liberal internationalism – must be informed by a clear-eyed assessment of the changes that are taking place in the world and how these changes impact specific issue-areas and Canada’s interests. This book, we believe, provides such an analysis. We also hope that this volume will be equally at home in a university student’s backpack, on a policy practitioner’s desk, in a journalist’s briefcase, and in the hands of anyone interested in Canada’s current and future role in the world.

The Context: Eight Global Shifts

The chapters below examine eleven different areas of international policy, but the starting point for this discussion is the rapidly transforming global context. To observe that the “world is changing” might be the refrain of every generation, but we are struck by both the acceleration of change in international affairs in recent years as well as the global scale of these transformations, which together make it essential to reassess the goals and methods of Canadian policy. Eight transformations, or global shifts, stand out as particularly significant for Canada.

The first is the rapid diffusion of economic power in the international system from the Western industrialized democracies to emerging states. During the Cold War, the Western allies produced more than two-thirds of global economic output. Now they account for about half. The speed of this transition is historically unprecedented. Two of the biggest emerging countries today, China and India, have experienced considerably higher rates of economic growth than previous rising powers did in their heyday. Britain took 154 years to double its per capita gross domestic product
(GDP) from $1300 to $2600. The United States took 53 years. China and India achieved this milestone in 12 and 16 years, respectively, and with much larger populations (see figure 0.1). If current trends hold, China is expected to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy in about 2021. If course, linear projections can be misleading, and there is more to national power than economic output, but the disparity in growth rates between the West and emerging powers in South America, Africa, and especially Asia are so pronounced and sustained, other aspects of power seem bound to follow, including military capabilities and political influence.

The second global shift is the diffusion of power from states to non-state actors, in part owing to the advent of “disruptive” digital technologies. In nearly every aspect of international affairs, digitally enabled actors are challenging the institutions that once held a monopoly on power. Although states are, and are almost certain to remain, the most powerful actors in world affairs, new
technologies are dramatically increasing the interconnectedness of individuals and enabling the growth of decentralized, networked forms of social and political organization. There is too often a disconnect between the norms, legal regimes, and institutions that were built to constrain and incentivize power in the twentieth century, and the actors and forms of behaviour that currently have power and influence online. As the US National Intelligence Council recently wrote, these changes “favour greater empowerment of individuals, small groups, and ad hoc coalitions” and the “increased power of non-state actors,” from diaspora networks to advocacy groups and terrorist organizations.\(^7\) The other side of this policy shift is that many of these same technologies can be exploited by states to increase surveillance and control of their citizens. The scale of the ambitions of both democratic and autocratic states in this regard is breathtaking. The struggle between hierarchical state power and distributed network power is likely to be a defining feature of global politics for the foreseeable future, but one thing is clear: states no longer dominate global affairs to the extent they once did. They now share the stage with non-state actors of all kinds, from the benign to the malign. In this more crowded world, effective international action will increasingly require forming coalitions and networks of like-minded states and non-state actors working towards common purposes – something that Canada has historically been good at doing.

The third shift – the waning of US leadership – is a partial consequence of the first two transformations. The diffusion of power makes it harder for the United States to influence global events to the extent that it did in the second half of the twentieth century. But declining American leadership is only partly due to changes in the international distribution of power. It also reflects US public opinion, which has expressed reservations about America continuing its global role, in numbers that have not been seen for a generation.\(^8\) Barack Obama’s foreign policy, which some view as restrained and others as overly cautious, has mirrored the mood of the American public. Although unforeseeable major events – black swans – have the potential to change Americans’ attitudes about foreign policy once again, for now economic pressures at
home and the legacy of two unpopular and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan appear to have diminished the will of Americans to continue playing the role of global policeman.

No one should write off the United States’ potential for an economic revival and re-energized foreign policy, but the deference that used to be paid to the United States by other states – a reaction based in respect or fear of American power, or both – seems to be dwindling. This has potentially far-reaching implications for the international security and economic order, which seems likely to develop in directions that do not reflect American or Western preferences and values. New threats and challenges – but also new opportunities for cooperation – will emerge. Trade and commercial relationships will be reordered and may include a shift towards preferential or regionally-based trading blocks and a weakening of universal-membership multilateral arrangements. Access to the US market will remain a vital Canadian interest, but we can no longer rely on American economic growth as a driver of Canadian prosperity.

The remarkable expansion of the global middle class, however, creates important new opportunities for Canadian investment and trade. This is the fourth global shift. As Robert Samuelson has pointed out, across the entire world, average per-capita incomes rose thirteen times from 1820 to 2010, but until recently these gains were concentrated in Western Europe and North America. Now, the gap between rich and poor nations is narrowing as millions of people in developing countries enter the middle class (figure 0.2). According to one estimate, by 2030, two-thirds of the global middle class will be residents of the Asia-Pacific region. Consumers in these countries are likely to become major drivers of global growth in the coming years – hence the importance of building trade and investment links with these economies. And these emerging markets are often driving new forms of consumption – leapfrogging many twentieth-century technologies and driving new global online marketplaces. Countries that do not develop extensive connections with these emerging markets will be at a disadvantage. Meanwhile, global demand for natural resources to fuel these economies is likely to remain strong over the
medium term, although short-term prices are subject to unpredictable fluctuations. Demand for educational services for the children of the emerging middle class will likely also grow steadily. Less salubriously, rapid industrialization and sharp increases in consumption will place even greater strains on the environment (see below). Nor is it a given that all these countries will successfully manage the social strains that accompany rapid economic change. The expanding middle class may demand political reform, including democratization.

A fifth transformation is the changing pattern of global energy sources and flows. With China becoming the world’s largest importer of oil and India poised to become the world’s largest importer of coal, global energy trade is reorienting itself from the Atlantic basin to the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, technological innovations that have made extracting shale gas and unconventional oil economically viable represent a “seismic development” for the geopolitics of energy, with the United States becoming the world’s largest producer of oil and natural gas liquids, surpassing even Saudi Arabia and Russia. Based on current projections,
North America may become self-sufficient in energy during the 2020s. These developments will have complex geopolitical effects. The United States may, for example, dramatically distance itself from the volatile Middle East, although its ability to do so may be limited by the fact that Middle East politics and policies will continue to shape the world price of oil. For Canada, the consequences of these shifts are also uncertain. Our oil is relatively expensive to produce, which is deeply problematic, including for provincial and federal finances, when prices drop. Alberta bitumen, in particular, has also come under criticism for the environmental costs associated with processing and transporting it. Nevertheless, Ottawa will almost certainly continue prioritizing the construction of infrastructure to ship landlocked oil to coastal terminals and to the United States.

The sixth global shift, related to the previous two, is **mounting pressure on the natural environment**, including climate change, arguably the most urgent global environmental challenge. Despite limited recent efforts to mitigate the causes of climate change, the most authoritative scientific information source on the subject, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), reports that total human-caused greenhouse gas emissions were the highest in human history from 2000 to 2010. Many ecosystems and societies are particularly vulnerable to extreme weather events linked to climate change, including heat waves, droughts, floods, cyclones, and wildfires, which can cause disruption of food and water supplies and damage to infrastructure and settlements, among other effects. Closer to home, Arctic sea ice has been decreasing in recent years (figure 0.3) and is “very likely” to continue shrinking during the twenty-first century, according to the IPCC. This will have significant implications for Canada’s Arctic policies and the geopolitics of the Arctic region, as countries seek to exploit new commercial shipping and resource extraction opportunities.

The seventh transformation is **increasing volatility and turbulence in global politics**, including the unravelling of some states in the Middle East and North Africa, where initially hopeful Arab Spring protests morphed into intensified repression or ethno-religious bloodletting that has the potential to worsen and
spread. Jihadist terrorism has become more diversified and decentralized, and its tactics now include attempts to radicalize the citizens of Western countries. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its deployment of combat units to support separatist fighters in western Ukraine represent a threat to Europe’s security that is unlike anything we have seen since the end of the Cold War. China, for its part, has become more assertive in its region, particularly in relation to its claims over parts of the South and East China Seas, heightening tensions with its neighbours. Overall, the world remains less dangerous than it has been for generations, but levels of violence are inching upwards and there appears to be a growing sense of disorder, magnified by the ubiquity and immediateness of social media that convey shocking, first-hand depictions of violence. There is reason to be concerned: some of these trends are genuinely disquieting.
The eighth and final shift is the increasingly strained global governance system. This system includes the complex panoply of formal and informal institutions and rules that have regulated international affairs since the end of the Second World War. As a moderately sized country particularly open to the world, Canada has always had an interest in helping to build and strengthen a rules-based international order. Even before Canada had its own independent foreign policy, it encouraged Britain and the United States to manage their North American disagreements through arbitration and joint commissions, and successfully argued for Canada to have a voice in these arrangements. A century later, after the Second World War, Canada played a modest but significant role in the negotiation of the San Francisco Treaty that led to the creation of the United Nations, and in discussions that established the global trading system and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Canadian governments used these and other multilateral arrangements to advance Canadian interests, ranging from commercial issues to arms control. Today, however, the “legacy institutions” of the post–Second World War era are failing to keep up with global power shifts or to address some of the world’s most pressing problems, from climate change to regional security tensions. As noted above, multilateral trade arrangements seem to be giving way to regional and preferential blocks. Human rights and humanitarian law is increasingly being disregarded in brutal civil conflicts, and the International Criminal Court seems to be facing a crisis of effectiveness and legitimacy. Furthermore, a whole new generation of digitally enabled actors – be they hackers, global protest movements, or digital activists – sit outside these institutions and tend to subscribe to different norms of behaviour. The rule-based international order was always imperfect and partial, but today it seems to be fraying.

There are, of course, many other shifts under way in the world – from rapid urbanization to the robotization and automation of production and warfare, an increasing number of refugees and displaced persons, a reduction in biodiversity, growing water scarcity, and the depletion of fish stocks. We have chosen to highlight the eight shifts above because they seem most likely to impact
Canada’s international policies. They also provide a global backdrop for the issue-specific chapters that follow.

Chapter Outline

The core of this book is a series of reflections on global change in eleven policy areas, and the implications of this change for Canada’s international strategy.

In the first chapter, Danielle Goldfarb, associate director of the Global Commerce Centre at the Conference Board of Canada, describes major global economic shifts and their implications for Canada. The rise of emerging markets and globalized production, she argues, will both intensify competitive pressures and open up massive new opportunities for Canadian companies, but Ottawa will need to help these companies to “go global.” Canadian firms are still too focused on the US market, and Canadian exports have flatlined in the face of rising Chinese competition. To achieve commercial success overseas, however, Canada needs to be an active and constructive global actor on non-economic issues, too, Goldfarb writes, because our trading partners “care about more than trade.” There also need to be policy changes at home, including measures to help workers to transition to higher-skilled employment.

Jennifer Keesmaat, chief planner and executive director in the City of Toronto, focuses on the role of cities as incubators of Canada’s knowledge and innovation economy. Cities are also critical to the successful integration of Canada’s large number of immigrants and to addressing problems of public health and environmental sustainability, she writes. Keesmaat suggests that Ottawa pursue an urban agenda that cuts across domestic and international policy. At home, this would see the federal government adopting a national transit strategy and affordable housing plan as part of the urban agenda. Abroad, Canada would pursue an “international partnership framework for cities” to help other nations manage various problems associated with urbanization. Keesmaat’s urban agenda thus addresses a number of policy domains – economic innovation, environmental sustainability, social cohesion and integration,
and international development – while also drawing attention to the rising role of cities as global actors in their own right.

Andrea Mandel-Campbell, director of corporate communications for Kinross Gold Corporation, and previously a journalist and author of *Why Mexicans Don’t Drink Molson*, makes the case that Canada needs to embrace its comparative advantage as a world leader in the mining sector and to see it as a space for innovation – an interesting contrast to Keesmaat’s chapter. Natural resources, Mandel-Campbell contends, will remain an anchor of global economic growth and strategically important, and smart and sustainable resource development is fundamental to the future of the planet. Instead of trying to emulate Silicon Valley, she argues, Canada should instead develop “global mining hubs” in Toronto, Calgary, Montreal, and Vancouver and support a policy agenda that provides incentives for technical and social innovation as well as increased productivity in the mining sector.

Andrew Leach, Enbridge Professor of Energy Policy, Alberta School of Business at the University of Alberta, explores Canada’s oil and gas sector, focusing in particular on our global competitiveness. Leach argues that the hydrocarbon industry must be seen not simply as resource producing, but rather as the next phase of development of Canada’s manufacturing sector. As he puts it, we are moving into an era of “manufactured energy.” Whereas Canada could once rely on cheap energy and skilled labour to build a manufacturing-based economy, we now need to shift our focus and innovation to the processing and moving of manufactured energy.

Stewart Elgie, director of the University of Ottawa’s Institute of the Environment, also writes about natural resources, but focuses instead on Canada’s carbon emissions and climate change policies. Canada, he points out, is a “high carbon emitter and producer in an increasingly carbon-constrained world,” but the fact that we rely more heavily on natural resource production and refining than other industrialized countries can be viewed as an opportunity, rather than a threat. Specifically, Canada should position itself as an international leader in the growing clean-energy and clean-technology sectors as the engines of a new economy. Our niche should be that of the “most environmentally responsible and innovative producer
of resource products,” he argues, which will require placing a price on carbon, among other things. He also contends that Canada should play a more constructive role internationally in devising new governance arrangements in the area of climate change.

Mark Raymond, Wick Cary Assistant Professor of International Security at the University of Oklahoma, is also interested in global governance, but focuses on regulation of the Internet, arguing that the challenges of governing the Internet will increasingly extend to the social and economic constructions with which it interacts, including financial markets, privacy and security policy, and public safety. Canada has a clear interest in getting Internet governance right, he argues, and especially in maintaining an open, globally interoperable and responsibly managed Internet. Raymond maintains that in such a fluid policy space, Canada’s first priority should be to ensure appropriate levels and kinds of policy learning, including both scientific research and policy experimentation. Further, Canada needs a patient, flexible approach to rule setting in relation to the Internet, which he calls a “soft law approach.”

The Internet also features in the chapter by Jonathan Paquin, assistant professor of political science at Laval University, who addresses Canada’s role in a rapidly changing global security environment. Paquin argues that traditional interstate relations are ill equipped to engage with fundamentally transnational contemporary global security threats such as cyberterrorism and climate change. The recent Canadian approach to this shifting security ecosystem, which he labels “tough-talk diplomacy,” has been insufficient, Paquin maintains. He argues that Canada should instead renew its military commitment to NATO, while also promoting and investing in alternate mediation and dispute-resolution approaches such as “collective conflict management,” and return to its role as a norm entrepreneur and international rule-builder, including on the issues of cyberespionage and lethal autonomous weapons systems.

David Petrasek, associate professor at the University of Ottawa and former special adviser to the secretary-general of Amnesty International, writes about human rights diplomacy. He argues that as the power and prestige of central state authorities decline,
the role of sub-national and municipal governments in protecting human rights will grow in importance, as will the role of the private sector. Canada’s “short-termism” and “erratic style” on human rights diplomacy has diminished its influence, he asserts. If Canada wants to make an impact, Petrasek writes, it must adopt a cross-party approach to human rights that can be sustained over time. Among other things, Canada should work to strengthen the UN’s independent and expert human rights monitoring bodies, even as we actively nurture other and new venues to advance human rights issues. He also suggests addressing situations of mass atrocity and attacks on civilian populations, the rights of migrants, and – with a nod to Keesmaat’s chapter – the human rights challenges arising from rapid urbanization in the developing world.

Emily Paddon, Rose Research Fellow in International Relations at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford University, and Jennifer Welsh, professor in international relations at the European University Institute and the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, consider the protection of civilians in conflict. Peacekeeping and humanitarian action have undergone radical transformations over the past fifteen years, they contend, and now typically include injunctions to protect civilians, but the sustainability of current practices is unclear. Canada could help improve the situation in three ways: by strengthening the role and functioning of UN’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, by re-engaging on the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect, and by pioneering policy-focused research on the role of diaspora in responding to humanitarian emergencies.

John McArthur, a Canadian economist who is visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution and senior fellow with the United Nations Foundation, considers Canada’s international development policies. He writes that Canada has been a weak performer in this area and that “global sustainable development” should be a centrepiece of Canada’s international strategy, in part because it has implications for so many other issues, from security to climate change. Canadian policy needs to prioritize knowledge and training, leverage private resources, and establish long-term commitments to specific objectives backed by significant resources, rather than flitting from one set of priorities to another.
In the penultimate chapter, Yves Tiberghien, director of the Institute of Asian Research at the University of British Columbia, offers an analysis of the global institutional context that reinforces points made in many of the preceding chapters: namely, the need to devise more (and more creative) forms of multilateral cooperation for this “new period of intense change, technological shift, global competition, great multi-level risks, and high volatility.” He argues that the existing apparatus of global governance is poorly equipped to manage “systemic risks” arising from globalization, particularly in the economic and environmental realms. Global connectivity has generated enormous benefits, he maintains, but it has also made the world more vulnerable to disruption and the “contagion” of instability. In his view, however, Canada is particularly well positioned to help stabilize the liberal economic order; it has the human capital and international connections to “nudge global institutions and catalyse new network formation between emerging and established powers.” Investing in these efforts would benefit Canada – by placing us at the centre of new networks and institutions – while also contributing to the global public good of increased stability and predictability at a moment of multifaceted global change.

The book concludes with a chapter by Roland Paris and Taylor Owen in which we summarize the main points of commonality across the chapters and draw lessons from the authors’ analyses and prescriptions. We then add some observations on the future of Canada’s international policy – a future, we argue, that remains full of promise.